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Abstract
We examine how the emergence of Covid-19 in Wuhan, and the ramifications of associ-
ated events, influence pro-sociality, trust and attitudes towards risk and ambiguity. We
assess these influences using an experiment consisting of financially incentivized eco-
nomic tasks. We establish causality via the comparison of a baseline sample collected
pre-epidemic with five sampling waves starting from the imposition of a stringent lock-
down in Wuhan and completed six weeks later. We find significant long-term increases
- measured as the difference between the baseline and final wave average responses - in
altruism, cooperation, trust and risk tolerance. Participants who remained in Wuhan
during the lockdown exhibit lower trust and cooperation relative to other participants.
We identify transitory effects from two events that permeated the public psyche. First,
in the immediate aftermath of the Wuhan lockdown, there is a decrease in trust and
an increase in ambiguity aversion. Second, the news of a high-profile whistleblower’s
death also decreases trust while heightening risk aversion.
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1 Introduction
In December 2019, a novel coronavirus and associated disease (Covid-19) emerged in the
city of Wuhan, capital of China’s Hubei province. Public health campaigns worldwide have
sought to align private and collective interests, promoting behavioural change as the first
line of defence in mitigating the virus’s impact on individuals’ well-being and livelihoods.
Collective action during a public health emergency relies first and foremost on the pro-social
and cooperative behaviours of individuals, their trust in others and the interplay between
their decision-making and perceptions of risk (Van Bavel et al., 2020).
In this paper, we report on a set of experiments designed to monitor the evolution of
altruism, cooperation, trust and attitudes towards risk and ambiguity in China during the
period from late January to early March 2020. That is, we directly measure economic
preferences during the early stages of the Covid-19 crisis. Our sample is drawn from a
population of 9,000 pre-registered Wuhan University students. We administered a standard
set of economic games and individual decision-making tasks to a repeated cross-section of
396 subjects from this population in their place of residence, via the WeChat social media
platform. All tasks were financially incentivized. We also have data from a pre-crisis baseline
sample of 206 subjects, collected from the same population in May 2019. An advantage of our
design is that we can assess long- and short-term effects of the pandemic, using a consistent
response elicitation method.
Sampling during the crisis took place over five waves and encompassed a period in which
several key events permeated the public psyche. We implemented the first sampling wave
on January 24/26. Person-to-person transmission of Covid-19 was publicly confirmed on
January 20 and three days later the central government of China imposed a strict lockdown
in Wuhan, quickly followed by lockdowns in other cities of Hubei province. By the time
of our first sampling wave, the daily search index on the word pneumonia using China’s
main search engine Baidu had risen abruptly to over 760,000 and China Central Television
was devoting more than 80 percent of its news coverage to pneumonia-related stories (see
the top panel of Figure 1).1 The second sampling wave was implemented on February 4/6,
the third on February 7/8. These two waves straddled the well-publicised death of Dr.
Li Wenliang, a high-profile Chinese whistleblower which sparked outrage among ordinary
citizens. To gain insight into the magnitude with which this event resonated in the Chinese
public’s consciousness, compare the two search index series in the bottom panel of Figure 1.2
The red series tracks the search index on Li Wenliang and the blue series tracks the search
index on Zhong Nanshan, one of China’s leading medical scientists who warned about the
transmissibility of Covid-19 after a visit to Wuhan on January 20.3 While the Zhong Nanshan
index spiked to over 1 million around the date of his visit to Wuhan, the Li Wenliang index
increased nearly five times more than this to over 5 million, following the announcement of
his death in the early hours of February 7. The fourth sampling wave was implemented two
weeks after this event, on February 21/22. We followed up with the final wave two weeks
later, on March 6/7, just days before the WHO declared the Covid-19 outbreak a global
pandemic.
Our first set of experiment findings relate to the long-term effects of the crisis. The
long-term is defined here as the change in average responses between the pre-crisis baseline
sample and the final sampling wave. We observe significant long-term increases in altruism,
trust and risk tolerance. There is also some evidence of a significant long-term improvement
in cooperation rates. We identify a differential effect in certain behaviours among those
subjects quarantined in Wuhan during the lockdown, where the perceived (and objective)
risk from the virus is highest during this period (see also Bu et al., 2020). These subjects
display significantly lower levels of trust and cooperation than others.
Our second set of findings concern transitory effects during the crisis. We observe marked
1In China, Covid-19 was referred to as pneumonia early on.
2This event was also widely covered by media outlets in the Western world. See, for
example: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/feb/07/coronavirus-chinese-rage-death-
whistleblower-doctor-li-wenliang.
3Zhong Nanshan is often referred to as the public face of China’s fight against the virus. See, for exam-
ple: https://www.npr.org/2020/04/15/835308147/meet-dr-zhong-nanshan-the-public-face-of-the-Covid-19-
fight-in-china?t=1596625232619.
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changes in behaviour during the sampling period, in the immediate aftermath of two events.
The first of these events is the lockdown of Wuhan city, after which we observe greater coop-
eration and risk tolerance. Subjects also display lower levels of trust and greater ambiguity
aversion around this time. This is perhaps unsurprising, since late January was the moment
of greatest uncertainty about the virus in Wuhan. Indeed, our measure of ambiguity aversion
returns to pre-crisis levels by the final wave of sampling. Additionally, there is a temporary
and significant fall in our behavioural measure of trust on the day after the death of Dr.
Li Wenliang. This event is associated with a short-term increase in risk aversion and - on
one measure - a fall in cooperation rates. All these measures later return to levels recorded
before this event.
Our study contributes to an established economics literature assessing how formative
experiences and events influence economic preferences and behaviour. Standard economic
models assume that individuals’ preferences are stable over time. This assumption is at
odds with studies in psychology, which emphasise the importance of personal experiences
in decision-making (Hertwig et al., 2004) and has been challenged by a series of empirical
works in economics and finance (e.g. Choi et al., 2009; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Guiso
et al., 2018; Andersen et al., 2019).
There are several experimental studies investigating the impact of traumatic events on
risk-related attitudes. The evidence here is mixed and appears to be context-specific. Many
studies report that individuals become more risk averse for various time horizons after expe-
riencing a natural disaster (Kim and Lee, 2014; Cameron and Shah, 2015; Beine et al., 2020),
yet others find a preference for risk-seeking after such an event (Eckel et al., 2009; Page et al.,
2014; Hanaoka et al., 2018; Kuroishi and Sawada, 2020). Callen et al. (2014) uncover a pref-
erence for certainty among survey respondents exposed to violence in Afghanistan during the
2000s, although Vieider (2018) suggest that their results are confounded by noise. Brown
et al. (2019) document a significant positive relationship between the intensity of violent
crime and risk aversion across local municipalities in Mexico. Cavatorta and Groom (2020)
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observe that Palestinian individuals affected by the deterrent wall between the West Bank
and Israel are more risk tolerant and more ambiguity averse.
To our knowledge, there is less empirical evidence regarding the effect of crises on social
preferences and trust. Fisman et al. (2015) find that subjects are more selfish in times of
economic recession than times of prosperity, whereas Voors et al. (2012) report that exposure
to violence in rural Burundi promotes altruistic behaviours. Cassar et al. (2017) find that
villagers affected by the 2004 tsunami in Thailand trust more after the disaster. David and
Sade (2020) find that at the outbreak of the Covid-19 crisis, subjects are more willing to
trust financial advice, and certain age groups display lower algorithm aversion, relative to a
comparable pre-crisis sample.
Our study also contributes to a rapidly growing literature assessing the impact of the
Covid-19 pandemic on economic preferences and beliefs (Angrisani et al., 2020; Binder,
Forthcoming; Brück et al., 2020; Coibion et al., 2020; Fetzer et al., Forthcoming; Li et al.,
2020). Various studies into the effect of the crisis on pro-social and risk-related behaviours
are ongoing and the results are not yet available for comparison (Duch and Jiao, 2020;
Lohmann et al., 2020; Théroude and Zylbersztejn, 2020).4 Pro-sociality has already been
observed to decrease in southern Spain during the pandemic, with a larger fall for older
people when there is a higher perceived mortality risk (Brañas-Garza et al., 2020). Li (2020)
conducted an online experiment in China in early March 2020, eliciting incentivized measures
of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity. He finds that ambiguity averse subjects are more
pessimistic about the impact of the pandemic on economic growth and are more likely to
reduce consumption and increase savings as a result.
At least two other studies report evidence on economic preferences from the epicentre of
the Covid-19 outbreak. Bu et al. (2020) administer a survey to a panel of graduate students
at the Wuhan University of Science and Technology before initial reports of the virus emerged
4A search of the AEA RCT Registry on 22 July 2020 for project titles containing the words ‘Coronavirus’
or ‘Covid-19’ returned a total of 63 uncompleted trials.
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and afterwards in their place of quarantine.5 They observe a significant decrease in levels of
financial risk taking and planned risk taking between waves and exploit geolocation data to
show that those subjects quarantined in Wuhan allocate 45 percent less to a hypothetical
gamble relative to those based in other provinces of China.6
In related work, Guo et al. (2020) deploy the same set of decision-making tasks as imple-
mented in this study but using a quite different design intended to measure the behavioural
effects of priming Wuhan University subjects with viral social media videos connected to
the Covid-19 crisis. Unlike the current paper, theirs is not an event study: they only elicit
responses at a single point in time, late January 2020. In their study, subjects are randomly
assigned to watch one of two videos, which had been circulating widely and anonymously
on Chinese social media, before making decisions. The video showed either the visit of a
prominent Government leader to Wuhan, or the arrival of health care volunteers into the
city. They find that the top-down communication conveyed in the leadership video induces
greater pro-sociality, but undermines trust, relative to a control condition. By contrast, the
bottom-up communication conveyed in the volunteer video increases pro-sociality, without
a negative effect on trust.
Our study continues in Section 2 with an outline of the experimental design, including
details of sampling, the decision-making tasks and protocol. In Section 3, we present the
main experiment results. We conclude in Section 4 with a discussion of our findings in
context of the related literature and a brief consideration of policy implications.
5Wuhan University of Science and Technology is a separate research institution to Wuhan University.
6The authors conduct a repeat survey in April 2020, in which they observe that financial risk taking
rebounds after the quarantine in Wuhan ends, suggesting that the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on
economic preferences are likely to be short-lived.
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2 Experimental Design
2.1 Sampling information
A timeline of our experimental sessions and events related to the Covid-19 pandemic is
presented in Figure 2. All subjects in our experiments were Wuhan University students,
randomly selected from a population of 9,000 subjects who had previously registered to
participate in decision-making experiments. Subjects were not informed about the tasks
that they would be asked to complete before registering for an experimental session.
Our baseline sample consists of 206 subjects recruited from this population, in May 2019,
for an unrelated research project investigating the impact of the experimental interface on
economic decision-making. Following the lockdown of Wuhan city on 23 January 2020, we
collected comparable data from a further 396 (different) subjects from the same population,
spread evenly across five sampling waves.7 The first wave of 79 subjects was collected on
January 24/26, in the immediate aftermath of the lockdown and enforced quarantine. The
second and third waves of 79 and 80 subjects, respectively, were collected on February 4/6
and 7/8, immediately before and after the death of Dr. Li Wenliang. The fourth wave of 78
subjects was collected on February 21/22, by which point there were over 63,000 confirmed
cases and 2,250 deaths in Hubei province. The final wave of 80 subjects was collected on
March 6/7, as the national epidemic transformed into a global pandemic with case numbers
rising internationally. By this stage, the number of local confirmed cases in Wuhan had
dropped from thousands to less than one hundred per day, with almost no local confirmed
cases in China outside of Wuhan.8,9
7In separate work in progress, “Does the interface matter? Economic decision making via smartphones
or laptops,” we find that subjects’ interface affects certain risk-related behaviours. Accordingly we maintain
a consistent experimental interface between the pre-crisis baseline sample and the subsequent experimental
waves. We also exclude from our analysis data a further four subjects in our 2020 waves and eighteen subjects
in our baseline sample who completed the tasks using a computer after we asked them to complete tasks
using a mobile phone.
8Virus case data is obtained from WHO situation reports, which can be found at:
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-reports/.
9As a robustness check, on February 15 and 16 we followed up with 92 randomly selected subjects of the
baseline sample and elicited repeat responses for the same set of tasks. In unreported results, we find similar
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In total, we recruited 602 subjects across the pre-crisis and crisis samples. The average
age in our full sample is 20 and 41 percent of subjects are female. Demographic characteristics
are similar across all five sampling waves during the crisis.10 We note that the proportion of
male subjects is lower in our pre-crisis sample (31 percent). Thus, we check the robustness
of all results after controlling for gender and other demographic variables. We also have
geo-location data, which we use to identify those subjects based in Wuhan during the crisis
(around 10 percent of the sample). Since most students from areas outside of Wuhan had
already left the city in early January to celebrate the Lunar New Year holiday, we can use
this to exploit quasi-random variation in exposure to the virus and associated events across
China.
2.2 Economic games
The following two sub-sections describe the decision-making tasks that were implemented in
our experiment.11 We employed a standard set of incentivized two-person games used in the
experimental economics literature to measure strategic behaviours. In each game, subjects
were randomly matched into pairs within the session and assigned to the role of either player
1 or player 2. Details of the games and what they measure are summarized below:
• Dictator game. Player 1 is allotted 5 RMB and decides how to allocate this sum of
money between the two players in the pair. Player 1’s allocation is final. Player 2 has
no decision to make. Amounts allocated by player 1 provide a measure of subjects’
altruism.
trends between this re-sample and the closest wave, Wave 3, in our cooperation, altruism and ambiguity
aversion measures.
10See Appendix Table A1 for further details, including about mobile phone display size and operating
system. At 21 percent, the iOS share in our sample is in line with the market share in China at the time of
the experiment (see https://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/china).
11We collected data from a further four tasks designed to inform on subjects’ levels of cognitive reasoning,
lying propensity and time preferences. Since these behaviours are not of direct interest to the current
research question, we do not report on them here. For completeness, details of these tasks are included in
the experiment instructions.
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• Ultimatum game. Player 1 is allotted 8 RMB and proposes an allocation of this
sum between the two players in the pair. Player 2 can choose to accept or reject
the allocation. In case of rejection, both players receive zero payoff for the task.
Acceptance rates capture subjects’ perceptions of fairness; offers capture expectations
about reciprocity.
• Trust game. Player 1 is allotted 8 RMB and decides how much of this sum of money
to send to player 2. Any money sent is multiplied by a factor of three before reaching
player 2. Any money not sent is kept by player 1. Player 2 observes the multiplied
transfer and decides how much of it to return to player 1. Any money not returned
is kept by player 2. Amounts sent capture subjects’ trust; amounts returned capture
subjects’ trustworthiness.
• Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Each player makes a simultaneous decision to Cooperate
or Defect. The choices are framed neutrally as options C or D. If both players choose
Cooperate, both players earn 6 RMB. If both players choose Defect, both players earn
3 RMB. If one player chooses Cooperate and the other player chooses Defect, the
cooperating player earns 0 RMB and the defecting player earns 9 RMB. Choices in
this game provide a measure of subjects’ cooperative tendencies.
• Stag Hunt game. Each player makes a simultaneous decision to choose a Safe or Risky
option. The choices are framed neutrally as options A or B. If both players choose Safe,
both players earn 3 RMB. If both players choose Risky, both players earn 8 RMB. If
one player chooses Safe and the other player chooses Risky, the safe player earns 3
RMB and the risky player earns 0 RMB. As suggested by Skyrms (2004), we interpret
a Risky choice as the intention to cooperate. We measure the level of cooperation in
the Stag Hunt game as the percentage of players choosing the Risky action.
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2.3 Individual decision-making tasks
In addition to the economic games described in the previous sub-section, we elicited infor-
mation about subjects’ attitudes towards risk and ambiguity by implementing the following
incentivized decision-making tasks:
• Risk attitude elicitation (gain domain). Subjects are presented with a series of nine
pairwise choices between a lottery (option A) and a sure amount of money (option B).
The lottery remains fixed across all choices: a 50 percent chance of receiving 9 RMB,
and a 50 percent chance of receiving 3 RMB. The sure amount increases uniformly
with each choice from 3 RMB to 9 RMB in increments of 0.75 RMB.12 After all choices
have been made, the system randomly selects one of the nine pairs of options and,
depending on the option chosen for this pair, determines the payoff for the task. A
later switching point (higher certainty equivalent) indicates greater willingness to take
risks.13
• Risk attitude elicitation (loss domain). Identical to the risk attitude elicitation in the
gain domain except that now the lotteries and sure amounts are framed as losses and
the sure amount decreases uniformly with each choice from 9 RMB to 3 RMB. A later
switching point (higher certainty equivalent) indicates greater willingness to take risks.
The payoff-relevant amount was subtracted from the subject’s earnings at the end of
the experiment.14
• Ambiguity attitude elicitation. Identical to the risk attitude elicitation except that
now, if subjects choose the lottery, a ball is randomly drawn from an opaque urn. The
urn contains both red and blue balls, but the number of each colour is unknown. If
the draw is red, they earn 9 RMB. If the draw is blue, they earn 3 RMB.15 A later
12This task is an adaptation of the well-established Holt and Laury (2002) multiple price list format.
13We exclude data from 29 subjects who switch more than once in this elicitation task.
14We exclude data from 13 subjects who switch more than once in this elicitation task.
15This task is based on the original thought experiment of Ellsberg (1961).
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switching point (higher certainty equivalent) indicates greater willingness to seek out
unknown situations.16
2.4 Procedural details
Invitations to participate in an experimental session were sent using the cloud-based An-
cademy platform.17 Ancademy is based on the open interface of WeChat. Upon joining
a session, subjects were redirected to a welcome screen describing the general experiment
guidelines. The economic games and individual decision-making tasks were then completed
sequentially, with instructions provided on arrival at each task.18 Feedback was provided
only after completion of all tasks. We excluded from a session either the Ultimatum or
Trust game task.19 At the end of a session, subjects answered a short questionnaire eliciting
standard demographic information, before viewing a screen containing his or her decision
outcomes and payment information.
Subjects were paid based upon the outcomes of all tasks. We made payments via the
WeChat pay facility on the same day. The experimental tasks were computerized using
oTree (Chen et al., 2016). Subjects were instructed to complete the tasks using their mobile
phone and we were able to check compliance with this instruction in the data. Subjects
were able to contact the experimenter via WeChat during the course of a session in case
of any questions. No subject could participate in more than one session. Sessions lasted
approximately forty-five minutes and payments averaged 65.68 RMB (about 9.5 US dollars),
including a participation fee of 10 RMB.
16We exclude data from 21 subjects who switch more than once in this elicitation task.
17https://www.ancademy.org/.
18An English translation of the original experiment instructions for each task is available in the Supple-
mentary Materials.
19We did this to minimize the possibility of second-mover learning (due to the sequential nature of the
tasks) as well as subject confusion due to the equivalence in stake size between those tasks.
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3 Results
In Figure 3, we plot the evolution of mean responses for the experimental tasks over time,
with associated 95 percent confidence intervals. The corresponding descriptive statistics are
contained in Table 1.
3.1 Pro-social, cooperative and trust behaviours
Regarding the economic games, we find that levels of altruism trend upwards during the
crisis. On average, the amount allocated by player 1s in the Dictator game is significantly
higher in Wave 5 - 39 percent of endowment - than in the pre-crisis baseline sample - 29
percent of endowment (p-value < 0.05).20 On the other hand, there is no significant difference
in Dictator game allocations between subjects in Wave 1 and the baseline (p-value = 0.42).
Offers in the Ultimatum Game are also significantly higher in Wave 5 than in the pre-crisis
sample, rising from 38.5 to 44.8 percent of the endowment (p-value = 0.05). Together,
our observations from the Dictator game and first-mover behaviour in the Ultimatum game
suggest that actual fairness norms and beliefs about perceived fairness norms were more
salient in Wuhan in early March 2020 than at the beginning of the lockdown period or
before the Covid-19 outbreak.
The evidence on cooperation is more mixed. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the pro-
portion of cooperative choices is 15 to 18 percentage points higher in the early stages of
the crisis, after the lockdown of Wuhan (Waves 1 and 2), compared to the pre-crisis base-
line and these differences are significant (respectively, p-value < 0.01 and p-value < 0.05).
Cooperation remains elevated in Wave 5, although the difference versus the baseline is not
statistically significant (p-value = 0.19). Cooperation in the Stag Hunt game is higher in
absolute terms, remaining generally above 80 percent, but does not differ significantly be-
tween the first and last waves of the crisis sample or in Wave 1 relative to its baseline level
20Unless otherwise indicated, p-values refer to two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of wave averages (sub-
ject as unit of observation).
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(respectively, p-value = 0.68 and p-value = 0.47). Reassuringly for the congruence of our
two measures, the time trends of cooperation rates are similar in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and Stag Hunt games during 2020 (see Figure 3).
We also observe significantly lower trust levels after the Wuhan lockdown. Amounts sent
by first movers in the Trust game fall from 3.39 to 1.75 between the pre-crisis and Wave 1
samples (p-value < 0.05). Amounts sent recover sharply in Wave 2, nearly tripling to 4.95,
which is substantially higher than the baseline level (p-value < 0.05). Trust levels remain
significantly higher in early March than at the beginning of the lockdown (Wave 5 versus
Wave 1, p-value < 0.01).21
Another pattern that we can infer from Table 1 is the pronounced fluctuation in be-
haviours during the second, third and fourth waves of 2020. As described earlier, data for
Waves 2 and 3 were collected either side of the controversial death of Dr. Li Wenliang, with
Wave 4 responses elicited two weeks later. This high-profile event appeared to significantly
undermine trust (p-value = 0.1) and cooperation as measured in the Stag Hunt game (p-
value < 0.01). Cooperative choices in the Prisoner’s Dilemma fall during this period too,
with cooperation rates 14 percentage points lower by Wave 4 compared to Wave 2 (p-value
= 0.1). We further observe a 13.8 percent decline in rates of giving in the Dictator game
between Waves 2 and 3, although this difference is not significant at conventional thresholds
(p-value = 0.22). Although the trend towards less trusting and less cooperative behaviour
is clear, it does not persist: by Wave 5 (four weeks after Wave 3), none of these behavioural
measures are significantly different from their Wave 2 level.
The results of a regression analysis reinforce our aggregate findings (see columns 1 to
5 in Table 2). For the measures of pro-sociality and trust, we use OLS regression and
for the measures of cooperation, we use logistic regression. In all regression specifications,
21It is difficult to draw valid inferences from unconditional statistics on second-mover decisions in the Trust
and Ultimatum games, since the distribution of first-mover amounts sent/offered varies between waves. Thus,
we conduct an additional regression analysis of second-mover decisions in which we obtain estimates for the
interaction terms between each Wave dummy and the amount sent/offered, after controlling for variation in
these amounts. The results of this analysis can be found in Table A2 of the Appendix.
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we include dummies for the five 2020 sampling waves (with the pre-crisis baseline as the
reference sample) and control for subject age, gender, location, mobile phone display size
and operating system. Robust standard errors are calculated.
As in the aggregate analysis, allocations in the Dictator game remain significantly higher
in Wave 5 versus the pre-crisis baseline sample after accounting for covariates (p-value <
0.01). In the Ultimatum game specification, the coefficient estimate for the Wave 5 dummy is
positive but only marginally significant (p-value = 0.1). Cooperative choices in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma are also significantly more likely in Waves 1 and 2 (both p-values < 0.01) and in
Wave 5 (p-value < 0.05) than in the baseline. Meanwhile, amounts sent in the Trust game
are 1.11 RMB lower in Wave 1, 2.01 RMB higher in Wave 2 and 1.43 RMB higher in Wave
5 versus the baseline (respectively, p-value < 0.05, p-value < 0.01 and p-value < 0.05). The
Wave 5 dummy in the Trust regression is significantly higher than the Wave 1 dummy (p-
value < 0.01, two-tailed Wald test). We also reject linear hypothesis tests that the coefficient
estimates for the Wave 2 and 3 dummies in the Stag Hunt regression are equal in favour
of the alternative that they are lower in Wave 3 (p-value = 0.09, two-tailed Wald test).
Similar qualitative results are found for the comparisons of Wave 2 and 4 dummies in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Trust game regressions (respectively, p-value < 0.05 and p-value =
0.01, two-tailed Wald tests).
Interestingly, we observe that those individuals quarantined in Wuhan during 2020 sent
significantly less money in the Trust game than those resident in other areas of China (p-
value < 0.01) - this effect size is large, amounting to over 62 percent of the average amount
sent in the full sample over the five sampling waves. A similar negative effect is found for
the likelihood of Wuhan based subjects to cooperate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, although
the evidence for this is statistically weaker (p-value < 0.1).
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3.2 Attitudes towards risk and ambiguity
Consistent with many prior experimental economics studies, we find risk aversion in the gain
domain across our sample - the average switching point for the pairwise lotteries ranges from
4.26 to 4.95, where a value of 5.5 would indicate risk neutrality. Unlike several post-crisis
studies cited in the introduction, however, we observe an increase in risk tolerance during
the early stages of the Covid-19 crisis. The average switching point is 4.67 in Wave 1 and
4.92 in Wave 2, versus 4.45 in the baseline (respectively, p-value < 0.1 and p-value < 0.01).
There is evidence that the domain matters for this effect: on average, subjects are risk-loving
in the loss domain but are less risk tolerant during the crisis than before. In Waves 2 and
3, the average switching points are 6.19 and 6.12, respectively, significantly lower than the
6.42 recorded in the baseline sample (both p-values < 0.05).
There is an initial rise in ambiguity aversion after the lockdown of Wuhan, with subjects
in the first two waves valuing the uncertain lottery at 4.15 and 3.93 respectively, significantly
below the average valuation of 4.49 before the crisis (Wave 1 p-value < 0.05, Wave 2 p-value
< 0.01). Our measure of ambiguity attitude returns close to its pre-crisis level in Wave 5, at
4.47. Risk tolerance, by contrast, remains significantly elevated at the end of the sampling
period relative to the baseline, at 4.95 (p-value < 0.01).
We also observe a significant increase in risk aversion over gains between Waves 2 and
3 (p-value < 0.01), which recovers in Wave 4. This resonates with our earlier analysis of
behaviour in the economic games and again suggests that the death of Dr. Li Wenliang
temporarily affected sentiment among ordinary Chinese citizens. With this in mind, we
note that our finding as to the long-term impact of the public health crisis on risk attitudes
contrasts with Bu et al. (2020), who report a generalized increase in risk aversion in a separate
population of Wuhan-based subjects. Aside from differences in dates of the baseline sample
for comparison (May versus October 2019) and risk elicitation measures (incentivized lottery
choices in our study versus hypothetical allocation and self-reported attitudes in theirs), one
explanation for the discrepancy may be that their follow-up survey was conducted in late
14
February 2020, after the death of Dr. Li Wenliang.
The results of a regression analysis support our findings on attitudes towards risk and
ambiguity after controlling for demographic information (see columns 6 to 8 in Table 2).
the coefficient estimates for the Wave 2 and 5 dummies in the risk attitude, gain domain,
specification are positive and significant (both p-values < 0.05). In the ambiguity attitude
specification, the coefficient estimates for the Wave 1 and 2 dummies are negative and highly
significant (both p-values < 0.01), while there is no economic or statistically significant
difference for the Wave 5 sample versus the pre-crisis baseline. We reject linear hypothesis
tests that the coefficient estimates for the Wave 2 and 3 dummies in the risk attitude gain
regression are equal in favour of the alternative that they are lower in Wave 3 (p-value <
0.01, two-tailed Wald test). Unlike for the economic games, we observe no significant effect
of being resident in Wuhan on attitudes towards risk and ambiguity, although we note that
the direction of the effect is towards greater risk and ambiguity aversion.
4 Conclusion
We provide experimental evidence of perturbations in economic preferences and pro-social
behavioural tendencies caused by significant events during the Covid-19 crisis in Wuhan,
China. We are able to compare participants’ choices from a baseline sample and fives waves
of sampling after the crisis onset, using a consistent response medium (WeChat) and in-
centivized tasks. We also use geo-location data to exploit the quasi-random variation in
subjects’ exposure to the virus and test for differences in behaviour among those subjects
who remained in Wuhan during the lockdown period.
We find significant long-term increases in altruism, cooperation and trust between before
and after the virus outbreak. Trust and to some extent cooperation are lower among those
subjects quarantined in Wuhan. We also add to the debate regarding the impact of traumatic
events on risk attitudes. In our sample, subjects exhibit a greater willingness to take risks
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during the crisis period. Ambiguity aversion also rises, but this increase is short-lived.
There is evidence of short-term fluctuations in preferences and behaviour in the immediate
aftermath of the lockdown of Wuhan city and the death of Dr. Li Wenliang, a high-profile
whistleblower on the virus. These events resonated in the collective consciousness in China
and our findings suggest the importance of accounting for the path-dependence of preferences
during a crisis. Many policy measures, such as local lockdowns, are short-term in nature
and require strong pro-social and cooperative behaviours amongst community members to
bolster the government’s response.
Ultimately, to assess the behavioural impact of events surrounding the Covid-19 crisis
requires robust and controlled measurements. Our study is a step in this direction. Future
work will continue to study how economic preferences evolve going forward, both inside and
outside of China.
16
References
Andersen, S., Hanspal, T. and Nielsen, K. M. (2019), ‘Once bitten, twice shy: The power of
personal experiences in risk taking’, Journal of Financial Economics 132(3), 97–117.
Angrisani, M., Cipriani, M., Guarino, A., Kendall, R. and Ortiz de Zarate, J. (2020), Risk
preferences at the time of COVID-19: An experiment with professional traders and stu-
dents, Working paper, FRB of New York Staff Report No. 927.
Beine, M., Charness, G., Dupuy, A. and Joxhe, M. (2020), Shaking things up: On the
stability of risk and time preferences, Working paper.
Binder, C. (Forthcoming), ‘Coronavirus fears and macroeconomic expectations’, The Review
of Economics and Statistics .
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Exposure to the COVID-19 pandemic and generosity, Working paper.
Brown, R., Montalva, V., Thomas, D. and Velásquez, A. (2019), ‘Impact of violent crime
on risk aversion: Evidence from the mexican drug war’, The Review of Economics and
Statistics 101(5), 892–904.
Brück, T., Ferguson, N. T. N., Justino, P. and Stojetz, W. (2020), Trust in the time of
corona, Working paper.
Bu, D., Hanspal, T., Liao, Y. and Liu, Y. (2020), Risk taking during a global crisis: Evidence
from Wuhan, Working paper.
Callen, M., Isaqzadeh, M., Long, J. D. and Sprenger, C. (2014), ‘Violence and risk preference:
Experimental evidence from afghanistan’, American Economic Review 104(1), 123–48.
Cameron, L. and Shah, M. (2015), ‘Risk-taking behavior in the wake of natural disasters’,
Journal of Human Resources 50(2), 484–515.
Cassar, A., Healy, A. and von Kessler, C. (2017), ‘Trust, risk, and time preferences after a
natural disaster: Experimental evidence from thailand’, World Development 94, 90 – 105.
Cavatorta, E. and Groom, B. (2020), ‘Does deterrence change preferences? evidence from a
natural experiment’, European Economic Review 127, 103456.
Chen, D. L., Schonger, M. and Wickens, C. (2016), ‘otree—an open-source platform for
laboratory, online, and field experiments’, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance
9, 88 – 97.
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. C. and Metrick, A. (2009), ‘Reinforcement learning
and savings behavior’, The Journal of Finance 64(6), 2515–2534.
Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y. and Weber, M. (2020), The cost of the COVID-19 crisis:
Lockdowns, macroeconomic expectations, and consumer spending, Working Paper 27141,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
David, D. B. and Sade, O. (2020), Robo-advisor adoption, willingness to pay, and
trust—before and at the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic, Working paper.
Duch, R. and Jiao, P. (2020), Coronavirus pandemic shock, economic prefer-
ences and beliefs: An online survey experiment, AEA RCT Registry, April 21,
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5731-1.0.
Eckel, C. C., El-Gamal, M. A. and Wilson, R. K. (2009), ‘Risk loving after the storm:
A bayesian-network study of hurricane katrina evacuees’, Journal of Economic Behavior
Organization 69(2), 110 – 124.
Ellsberg, D. (1961), ‘Risk, ambiguity, and the savage axioms’, The Quarterly Journal of
17
Economics 75(4), 643–669.
Fetzer, T., Hensel, L., Hermle, J. and Roth, C. (Forthcoming), ‘Coronavirus perceptions and
economic anxiety’, The Review of Economics and Statistics .
Fisman, R., Jakiela, P. and Kariv, S. (2015), ‘How did distributional preferences change
during the great recession?’, Journal of Public Economics 128, 84 – 95.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2018), ‘Time varying risk aversion’, Journal of
Financial Economics 128(3), 403–421.
Guo, Y., Shachat, J., Walker, M. J. and Wei, L. (2020), ‘Viral social media videos can raise
pro-social behaviours when an epidemic arises’, ESI Working Paper 20-15 .
Hanaoka, C., Shigeoka, H. and Watanabe, Y. (2018), ‘Do risk preferences change? evidence
from the great east japan earthquake’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
10(2), 298–330.
Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E. U. and Erev, I. (2004), ‘Decisions from experience and
the effect of rare events in risky choice’, Psychological Science 15(8), 534–539. PMID:
15270998.
Holt, C. A. and Laury, S. K. (2002), ‘Risk aversion and incentive effects’, American Economic
Review 92(5), 1644–1655.
Kim, Y.-I. and Lee, J. (2014), ‘The long-run impact of a traumatic experience on risk
aversion’, Journal of Economic Behavior Organization 108, 174 – 186.
Kuroishi, Y. and Sawada, Y. (2020), On the stability of preferences: Experimental evidence
from two disasters, Working paper.
Li, K. K. (2020), How does the COVID-19 outbreak affect people’s expectation about the
macroeconomy?, Working paper.
Li, K., Qin, Y., Wu, J. and Yan, J. (2020), Containing the virus or reviving the economy?
Evidence from individual expectations during the COVID-19 epidemic, Working paper.
Lohmann, P., Gsottbauer, E., Kontoleon, A. and You, J. (2020), Preferences and economic
decision-making in the wake of COVID-19: Experimental evidence from China, EEA
Registry 2020.
Malmendier, U. and Nagel, S. (2011), ‘Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences
Affect Risk Taking?’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(1), 373–416.
Page, L., Savage, D. A. and Torgler, B. (2014), ‘Variation in risk seeking behaviour following
large losses: A natural experiment’, European Economic Review 71, 121 – 131.
Skyrms, B. (2004), The stag hunt and the evolution of social structure, Cambridge University
Press.
Théroude, V. and Zylbersztejn, A. (2020), Norms that make us cooperative: Using the
COVID-19 lockdown as a natural experiment, EEA Registry 2020.
Van Bavel, J. J., Baicker, K., Boggio, P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., Crockett,
M. J., Crum, A. J., Douglas, K. M., Druckman, J. N. et al. (2020), ‘Using social and
behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response’, Nature Human Behaviour
pp. 1–12.
Vieider, F. M. (2018), ‘Violence and risk preference: Experimental evidence from
afghanistan: Comment’, American Economic Review 108(8), 2366–82.
Voors, M. J., Nillesen, E. E. M., Verwimp, P., Bulte, E. H., Lensink, R. and Van Soest,
D. P. (2012), ‘Violent conflict and behavior: A field experiment in burundi’, American
Economic Review 102(2), 941–64.
18
0.00 M
0.25 M
0.50 M
0.75 M
1.00 M
0 % 
25 % 
50 % 
75 % 
100 % 
Jan 04 Jan 09 Jan 14 Jan 19 Jan 24 Jan 29 Feb 03
Date
B
ai
du
 In
de
x
C
C
T
V
 new
s tim
e proportion
Baidu index of pneumonia CCTV news of pneumonia
0.0 M
1.0 M
2.0 M
3.0 M
4.0 M
5.0 M
Jan 19 Jan 23 Jan 27 Jan 31 Feb 04 Feb 08 Feb 12
Date
B
ai
du
 In
de
x
Li Wenliang index Zhong Nanshan index
Figure 1: Public awareness of Covid-19 and related events in the early stages of the crisis
Notes. Top panel : The red series is the Baidu search index on the word pneumonia (in
Chinese language). Max value is 760,460; The blue series is the time proportion spent
covering pneumonia-related stories (later called Covid-19) on China Central Television
(CCTV) news. Max value is 83%. Bottom panel : The red series is the Baidu search index
on Li Wenliang. Max value is 5,007,063; The blue series is the Baidu search index on
Zhong Nanshan, the chief scientist in China who first revealed human to human
transmission of Covid-19. Max value is 1,186,091.
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Figure 2: Timeline of events and experimental sessions
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Figure 3: Time series of economic behaviours and preferences
Notes. Mean values with error bars +/- 1 standard error. For Trust game and Ultimatum
game, series is amount sent/offered by first mover. PD = cooperation in Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, SH = cooperation in Stag Hunt game.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics over time
Baseline Wave 1 Wave 2
mean sd. mean sd. mean sd.
Dictator game (0-5) 1.45 1.08 1.58 1.07 1.67 1.05
Stag Hunt game (0,1) 0.88 0.33 0.84 0.37 0.82 0.39
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (0,1) 0.31 0.46 0.49A 0.50 0.46A 0.50
Trust game sent (0-8) 3.39 2.59 1.75A 1.80 4.95A 2.48
Ultimatum game offer (0-8) 3.08 1.04 3.36 1.21 3.16 1.31
Risk attitude, gain (1-10) 4.45 1.13 4.67a 0.86 4.92A 1.47
Risk attitude, loss (1-10) 6.42 1.14 6.29 0.98 6.19A 1.18
Ambiguity attitude (1-10) 4.49 1.33 4.15A 1.4 3.93A 1.46
Number of subjects 206 79 79
Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
mean sd. mean sd. mean sd.
Dictator game (0-5) 1.44 1.01 1.65 1.12 1.95A 1.04
Stag Hunt game (0,1) 0.70A 0.46 0.71A 0.46 0.80 0.40
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (0,1) 0.39 0.49 0.32c 0.47 0.49 0.50
Trust game sent (0-8) 3.6c 2.44 3.66 2.73 4.43B 2.59
Ultimatum game offer (0-8) 3.38 1.04 3.05 1.28 3.58A 1.23
Risk attitude, gain (1-10) 4.26C 1.18 4.71 1.42 4.95A 1.58
Risk attitude, loss (1-10) 6.12A 1.31 6.5c 1.00 6.28 1.34
Ambiguity attitude (1-10) 4.18A 1.75 4.41 1.55 4.47C 1.55
Number of subjects 80 78 80
The following tests are two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
Note: ap<0.1, Ap<0.05, Ap<0.01 for comparison of means Wave versus Baseline;
bp<0.1, Bp<0.05, Bp<0.01 for comparison of means Wave 5 versus Wave 1.
cp<0.1, Cp<0.05, Cp<0.01 for comparison of means Wave 3/4/5 versus Wave 2.
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Table 2: Regression Results
Dependent variable
Trust Pro-sociality Cooperation Risk Ambiguity
UG DG SH PD Gain Loss
OLS OLS OLS Logistic Logistic OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wave 1 −1.15∗∗ 0.28 0.22 −0.35 0.91∗∗∗ 0.18 −0.20 −0.41∗∗
(0.54) (0.32) (0.19) (0.39) (0.29) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18)
Wave 2 2.00∗∗∗ 0.03 0.31 −0.45 0.83∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗ −0.29∗ −0.59∗∗∗
(0.59) (0.37) (0.20) (0.37) (0.29) (0.21) (0.17) (0.21)
Wave 3 1.00 0.36 0.09 −1.11∗∗∗ 0.43 −0.22 −0.40∗∗ −0.35
(0.63) (0.26) (0.19) (0.34) (0.29) (0.16) (0.17) (0.23)
Wave 4 0.71 −0.02 0.24 −1.06∗∗∗ 0.09 0.23 0.02 −0.09
(0.65) (0.31) (0.20) (0.35) (0.29) (0.18) (0.14) (0.19)
Wave 5 1.42∗∗ 0.54 0.57∗∗∗ −0.47 0.54∗ 0.42∗∗ −0.21 −0.09
(0.63) (0.33) (0.19) (0.37) (0.28) (0.20) (0.17) (0.20)
Wuhan −2.24∗∗∗ −0.20 −0.26 −0.01 −0.68∗ −0.05 −0.02 −0.14
in 2020 (0.57) (0.57) (0.24) (0.43) (0.40) (0.19) (0.18) (0.24)
Control Demographics, phone display size & OS
variables
Constant 2.44 5.16∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗ 1.94 −2.45 3.24∗∗ 3.84∗∗∗ 2.12
(4.42) (1.83) (1.07) (2.00) (1.62) (1.38) (0.92) (1.35)
Observations 153 151 304 593 594 565 581 573
R2 0.21 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03
Log Likelihood -279.00 -381.70
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in
parentheses. For Trust and Ultimatum game (UG), dependent variable is amount sent/
offered by first mover. DG = Dictator game, PD = Prisoner’s Dilemma game, SH =
Stag Hunt game.
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Appendix
In Table A1, we present information about subject demographics, mobile devices used to
complete the experiment and whether subjects were based in Wuhan during the lockdown
in 2020. This information is provided both for the full sample and by experimental wave.
Table A1: Sample demographics and covariates (mean and standard deviation)
Full sample Baseline Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
Number of subjects 602 206 80 78 80 78 80
Age 20.41 20.18 20.11 20.83 20.70 21.56 20.23
[1.84] [1.67] [1.51] [3.55] [1.78] [4.85] [1.27]
Male 0.41 0.31 0.44 0.55 0.44 0.44 0.45
[0.49] [0.46] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50]
Monthly expenditure 2.58 2.57 2.54 2.51 2.63 2.59 2.65
[0.68] [0.71] [0.62] [0.68] [0.68] [0.71] [0.66]
Phone size (in) 5.89 5.74 6.04 5.93 5.93 5.99 5.93
[0.54] [0.58] [0.47] [0.48] [0.59] [0.49] [0.52]
iOS 0.21 0.25 0.19 0.13 0.25 0.1 0.26
[0.41] [0.44] [0.39] [0.34] [0.44] [0.31] [0.44]
Wuhan in 2020 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.06 0.08
[0.29] [0.32] [0.31] [0.33] [0.25] [0.27]
Note: Monthly expenditure: 1 = less than 800 RMB;
2 = 800 ∼ 1500 RMB; 3 = 1500 ∼ 2500 RMB;
4 = 2500 ∼ 4000 RMB; 5 = greater than 4000 RMB.
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In Table A2, we present the results of a regression analysis on second-mover behaviour in
the Trust and Ultimatum game tasks. For the Trust game, we conduct an OLS estimation in
which the dependent variable is the return rate (amount returned by player 2 as a proportion
of the amount sent by player 1). As a consequence of this variable definition, any pair in
which the first-mover sends zero is excluded from the regression. For the Ultimatum game,
we conduct a Logistic regression in which the dependent variable is player 2’s acceptance
decision. Since the distribution of first-mover actions varies across waves, we interact the
amount sent/offered with the wave dummies and with the dummy variable for being quar-
antined in Wuhan, to check for differential levels of reciprocity among these subjects. We
control for subject age, gender, location, mobile phone display size and operating system.
Robust standard errors are calculated.
As expected, there is a positive and significant correlation between amounts sent/offered
and return rates/acceptances (both p-values < 0.01). A test of joint significance for the inter-
actions between the wave dummies and amount sent/offered is not significant for the Trust
game (p-value = 0.31, two-sided Wald test) but is significant for the Ultimatum game (p-
value < 0.01, two-sided Wald test). While there is no significant variation in trustworthiness
across waves, acceptance rates conditional on offers in the Ultimatum game are significantly
higher in Wave 1 (p-value < 0.01) and Wave 2 (p-value < 0.1) than in the pre-crisis baseline
sample. Those subjects based in Wuhan during the lockdown are on average less likely to
accept an offer in the Ultimatum game than those located in other areas of China (p-value <
0.01). They also display greater reciprocal considerations: for each additional unit received
in the Trust and Ultimatum games, these subjects return comparatively more and display a
comparatively larger propensity to accept an offer (both p-values < 0.01).
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Table A2: Regression results for second mover in the Trust game and Ultimatum game
Dependent variable:
Trust game return rate Ultimatum game acceptance
OLS Logistic
(1) (2)
First mover sent/offer 0.16∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.50)
Wave 1 * First mover sent/offer 0.03 1.79∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.49)
Wave 2 * First mover sent/offer −0.01 3.14∗
(0.03) (1.82)
Wave 3 * First mover sent/offer −0.03 −0.01
(0.02) (0.43)
Wave 4 * First mover sent/offer 0.02 0.04
(0.03) (0.37)
Wave 5 * First mover sent/offer 0.02 0.19
(0.03) (0.53)
Wuhan in 2020 −0.40 −15.03∗∗∗
(0.37) (1.40)
Wuhan in 2020* First mover sent/offer 0.16*** 7.82***
(0.10) (0.83)
Control variables Demographics, phone display size & OS
Constant −0.04 −8.49
(0.70) (8.43)
Observations 127 151
R2 0.44
Log Likelihood −27.40
Wald test for fixed coefficients p-value 0.31 < 0.01
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses.
In column (1), pairs in which the first mover sent zero are excluded, hence the smaller sample size.
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